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U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST 
CHINA AS A REACTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
ABUSES DURING THE TIANANMEN CRISIS
The article focuses on  foreign policy conducted  by  B ush’s adm inistration in the afterm ath 
o f T iananm en massacre. In June  1989 governm ental forces brutally in tervened in the Tia­
nanm en  Square in Beijing w here a student-led  m ovem ent developed  into an anti­
governm ent dem onstration. The crackdow n resulted in the death  o f hundreds of army
soldiers, students and  o ther dem onstrators. The incident d rew  im m ediate and  dram atic
international reactions. The U.S. im posed  very b road  sanctions w hich included
a suspension  of official and  military exchanges betw een  the tw o governm ents,
a prohibition  on  U.S. trade financing and  m any others. But the m ost severe U.S. sanction
against China w as a linkage of C hina’s MFN (Most Favored N ation) status to hum an rights
that w as the subject o f a long-lasting debate  betw een  the legislative and  executive b ran ­
ches of the U.S. governm ent. The au thor tries to  prove that U.S. econom ic sanctions did
no t im prove (as usual) the hum anitarian situation and  the concessions m ade by  Chinese
governm ent w ere just “cosm etic” and  had  a clear political motive.
D uring his term  in office, President Reagan conducted a policy o f norm alization and 
cooperation w ith the P eople’s Republic of China. The adm inistration believed that if 
it could w in the confidence of Communist China, then a w ide array o f areas for 
cooperation w ould  o pen  up. Moreover, the Reagan adm inistration recognized that 
an  em phasis on  hum an rights could serve to strengthen its overall foreign policy.1 
By highlighting the deficiencies in the hum an rights record o f o ther nations, the 
adm inistration was able to provide an  ideological coherence to its policies and  so 
gain dom estic and  international public support2 (G arson 1994： 177). This approach 
to U.S.-China relations revealed the duality o f Reagan’s policy that w as seem ed al­
m ost im possible to reconcile.
China objected to the U.S. accusations of hum an rights abuses, bu t sim ultaneo­
usly hoped  that they could be contained as essentially cosm etic devices. If they 
could justify their liberalization process as consistent w ith U.S. policy objectives, they 
could be  beneficiaries o f a change of heart in the United States. They needed  Ameri­
can aid and  investm ent and  recognized that U.S. involvem ent in the m odernization 
program  w as determ ined by  W ashington’s approval (Trucker 1988/89： 19-22).
Both countries derived benefit from  closer ties betw een  their nations. In 1987, 
300,000 Americans traveled to China and  20,000 Chinese students w ere studying in
1 D espite this fact, that Reagan had  previously criticized hum anitarian foreign policy of 
President Carter.
2 The Reagan adm inistration perceived that p rom otion of hum an rights, in p laces like the 
Philippines, Haiti and  Chile, concurred  w ith American strategic interests.
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American universities. The U.S. was second, only to H ong Kong, in its level o f direct 
investm ent in China. Trade betw een  the tw o countries increased 28% from  1987 to
1988. China w as the thirteenth largest trading partner o f the United States, and  was 
the leading overseas m arket for w heat (G arson 1994: 184).
Despite the econom ic grow th in the late 1980s, the discontent am ong Chinese 
peop le  w as spreading. The students systematically organized anti-governm ent de­
m onstrations. The protest m ovem ent in May and  June 1989 had  its root in the politi­
cs and  econom ic problem s of China. A new  five-year plan  for price reform  resulted 
in the anticipation of massive inflation that prom pted  a run  on  the banks, as people 
w anted  to buy consum er goods before the price increased. Additionally, the greater 
discretionary authority given to individual enterprises and local governm ents 
b rought about a dim inution in state revenues. In the process of reform  a new  class 
em erged, consisting o f peop le  w ho w ere in a better position to exploit the new  
rules, especially high level officials and  their children. The governm ent encouraged 
a segm ent of the population  to enrich itself3 (G arson 1994： 187). In January 1987, the 
General Secretary o f the Chinese Com m unist Party launched a new  cam paign against 
“bourgeois liberalization” to regain political pow er. Many intellectuals found  them ­
selves m arginalized,4 so they began  to challenge the suprem acy of their rulers.
The econom ic reforms had  also encouraged cultural diversity and  had delibera­
tely exposed  China to a variety of W estern cultural products (G arson 1994： 188), 
from  literature, through overseas radio broadcasts and  films, to American food. 
Exposure to the ideas and  m odels o f the W estern w orld provided a new  aw areness 
o f political and  cultural alternatives to Chinese students w ho had  studied in the
U nited States. Moreover, the political changes in Eastern Europe and  the Philippines
(the overthrow  the Marcos regime), and  the daw n of political pluralism  in Taiwan,
induced a great sense of autonom y and  independence w ithin China. Because of the
“o p en  doors” policy, it was believed that China was no  longer im m une to interna­
tional public opinion and  that pressure for further reform  was likely to be applau­
ded, and  thus fruitful (G arson 1994: 189).
A nother issue that reinforced the protest m ovem ent in China w as the death  of Hu 
Yaobang, a Party Chairman, on  15th April 1989. He was the greatest Chinese refor­
m er w ho pushed  China tow ards a m arket econom y and  a m ore o p en  political sys­
tem. The dem onstrators rapidly hailed him  as a cham pion of dem ocracy and  started 
a crusade that called for a reappraisal o f H u’s disgrace, an apology for the anti 
“spiritual pollution” cam paign, dem ocratic elections to the National P eople’s Con­
gress, and freedom  o f the press. Secretary-General Zhao Ziyang supported  the de­
m onstrators saying that their “reasonable dem ands” should  be m et by  dem ocratic 
m eans. Zhao w ent to Tiananm en Square on  19th May and encouraged the crowds, 
after that he w as im m ediately ousted  from  the top party position and attacked p u ­
blicly (Fincher Fall 1989: 3-25). The w ay to military crackdow n had  b een  opened.
Martial law  w as declared, tanks and  w ater cannons w ere brought into the city, 
and  troops arrived in droves at the railway station. In the early m orning o f 4 June
1989, a convoy of trucks accom panied by  arm ed infantry storm ed the crow d gathe­
red  the T iananm en Square and  random ly shot people. Tanks m oved across the city, 
firing rapidly. B lood w as shed  indiscriminately. The bodies w ere laid out for the
3 For exam ple, a teacher at university earned  only 122 yuan a m onth, 20% less than the 
average construction w orker.
4 A lthough technicians and  intellectuals had  expected  to  play a large role in the planning 
o f the reform  program .
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relatives to identify. The governm ent’s intention was clear： to frighten the opposition 
and  guarantee the Party’s authority (G arson 1994： 189-190).
The new s o f the T iananm en massacre flashed around the world. China’s dom e­
stic politics could be found on  the agendas of the countries that had  b een  China’s 
closest partners. W estern Europe’s political leaders condem ned the crackdow n. In 
the United States, President G eorge Bush, Reagan’s successor com pelled the w orld 
to call a tem porary halt to the favorable treatm ent given to Chinese trade (suspen­
ding the Most Favored Nations status -  MFN). The situation on  the international, 
political arena deteriorated by the official reaction of the Chinese governm ent, w hich 
b lam ed W estern involvem ent in its m odernization policies (G arson 1994： 190). In 
summary, China reaffirm ed its ties w ith the W est and at the sam e time it condem ned 
the consequences of those ties.
Primarily, the steps taken by  the Bush adm inistration tow ards the com m unist re­
gime w ere m inim al； banning  military exports and  exchanges bu t refusing non­
defense related sanctions5 (Hurst 1999： 39-40). However, the Chinese governm ent’s 
repression continued, w ith pro-dem ocracy activists being rounded  up , jailed and, in 
som e cases, executed. Faced w ith this, the Bush adm inistration was forced to take 
further steps, and on  20th June boarder sanctions w ere im posed, consisting of the 
suspension of high-level contracts, Export-Im port bank  loans, postponem ent of lo­
ans from  multilateral developm ent banks,6 and an arms em bargo7 (Hurst 1999： 40). 
The U.S. also pu t pressure on  the W orld Bank to suspend  $780 million in loans. 
President Bush im m ediately granted hum anitarian aid to the Red Cross and  m et w ith 
a small group of dissident students in the W hite House. However, econom ic sanc­
tions im posed by  the Bush’s adm inistration intentionally m issed the target. Bush 
tried to react to the hum anitarian tragedy in China w ithout deteriorating m utual eco­
nom ic relations. That is why, certain types of sanctions that w ere com ponents of 
sanctions regime could no t (and  they did not) generate sufficient pressure o n  Chine­
se econom y.
China’s international trade did no t suffer m uch from  the Tiananm en crisis. From 
1989 to 1994, China’s total im ports and  exports, m easured in constant dollars, m ain­
tained a positive grow th rate. U.S.-China trade also rose from  less than $20 billion in 
1989 to m ore than $50 billion in 1994, although U.S. exports decreased by 17% in 
1990. U.S. investm ent in China increased from  a m ere $284 million in 1989 to about 
$2.5 billion in 1994 (Askari, Forrer, Teegen, Yang 2003, 22). U.S. export controls 
(export licensing) have im peded U.S. exports to China and  resulted in a large U.S. 
trade deficit that caused job losses in the U nited States. The H ouse of Representa­
tives unanim ously adop ted  new  sanctions against China, bu t President Bush was 
given discretion over their im plem entation8 (G arson 1994： 191).
5 The adm inistration’s first concern  w as to avoid dam age to  the U.S.-China bilateral rela­
tions.
6 Such as the Asian D evelopm ent B ank (ADB), G lobal Environm ental Facility, International 
D evelopm ent Association, International Finance C orporation, Asian D evelopm ent Foundation, 
and  the Japanese Special Fund o f the ADB.
7 China took a few  retaliatory m easures against the U.S. bu t they w ere rather sym bolic； 
such as the jam m ing o f som e frequencies u sed  by  the Voice of America and  suspending  the 
scholar exchange program s.
8 “I know  the C hinese,” Bush told his aids. “I know  how  to deal w ith them , and  it’s no t 
through pressure and  sanctions.”
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Table 1. Selected China’s economic indicators 1 9 8 7 -1 9 9 5 9
Year
G row th 
rate (%)
CPI 
(annual %)
Trade balan­
ce
($ millions)
Current 
account 
balance 
($ m illions)
International 
reserves 
($ m illions)
G row th rate of 
China’s to ta l 
trade (%)
1987 11,6 7,22 -1 6 6 1 ,0 3 0 0 ,0 1 6304 ,9 2 4 ,69
1988 11,3 18,74 -5 3 1 5 ,0 -3 8 0 2 ,0 1 8541 ,3 3 7 ,19
1989 4,1 18,33 -5 6 2 0 ,0 -4 3 1 7 ,0 1 7959 ,9 3 1 ,03
1990 3,8 3,06 9 165,0 1 1997,0 2 9 5 86 ,2 12,80
1991 9,2 3 ,54 8 7 4 3 ,0 1 3272 ,0 4 3 6 7 4 ,3 26,01
1992 14,2 6,34 5 183,0 6 4 0 1 ,0 2 0 6 2 0 ,4 3 1 ,17
1993 13,5 14,58 -1 0 6 5 4 ,0 -1 1 6 0 9 ,0 2 2 3 86 ,9 21,21
1994 12,6 2 4 ,24 7 290,0 6 9 0 8 ,0 52914,1 19,80
1995 10,5 16,90 18050,1 1 618,4 7 5 3 76 ,7 18,99
Sources: China National Bureau of S ta tistic, China S ta tistics Yearbook (various issues), Internatio­
nal M onetary Fund, International Financial S ta tistics (various issues).
The political turmoil did no t im pede the process of econom ic reform  in China. 
Realizing that political instability was due partly to rising inflation, the Chinese 
governm ent readjusted its m onetary policy by  reducing m oney supply. Inflation, 
m easured by the consum er price index (CPI), declined from  m ore than 18% in 1988 
and  1989 to roughly 3% in 1990 and  1991 (see Table 1). This trend w as accom pa­
nied by slow er econom ic growth, at rates of 4.1% and  3,8% in 1989 and  1990, re­
spectively (Askari, Forrer, Teegen, Yang 2003： 20).
President Bush was convinced that the T iananm en m assacre w as a blip and  se­
cretly w orked  to limit the dam age to Sino-American relations10 (Hurst 1999： 39). He 
believed that m em ories w ere short and that China could be kep t on  the course of 
reform  (G arson 1994： 198). The U.S. Congress dem anded  tougher actions, bu t it 
soon  becam e clear that the Bush adm inistration w ould  no t take any further steps to 
punish  China. Congress began  to introduce its ow n m easures, i.e., a com prehensive 
sanctions am endm ent to the Foreign Relations A uthorization Act, w hich stipulated 
that sanctions w ould  no t be lifted until the President proved that China w as in the 
process o f reforming. Congress expected  the Chinese governm ent to lift martial law, 
to en d  the reprisals against the dem onstrators and to m ove tow ards w ider protection
9 The au thor decided  on  the time interval be tw een  1987 and  1995 to  com pare the Chinese 
econom ic situation before the T iananm en crisis and  a few  years later. This analysis assum es 
neither estim ating deep ly  the influence o f U.S. sanctions on  C hina’s m acroeconom ic indicators 
n o r testing the sanctions’ effectiveness bu t outlining the international political environm ent 
w hich  resulted in the U.S. econom ic sanctions im position. For further research： H.G. Askari, 
J. Forrer, H. Teegen, and  J. Yang, E conom ic Sanctions. E xam in ing  Their Philosophy a n d  E ffi­
cacy, W estport, Connecticut, L ondon： Preager, 2003.
10 A sked w hy  he had  failed to take a stronger line on  the hum an rights issue, Bush said 
that he believed  that ‘quiet discussion’ w as beter than ‘beating  [one’s] b reasts’ publicly in such 
affairs’.
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o f hum an rights.11 Executive orders can be rescinded as quickly as they are im posed
so Congress w anted  the sanctions to have the force o f law 12 (Hurst 1999： 207). China
had  to realize that it w ould  no t be sufficient to persuade the President or the Secre­
tary of State in the com fortable haven of private discussion that relations w ould
revert to a norm al footing as soon as possible.13
Sanctions w ould  include the revocation o f MFN status and  a 4-year extension for 
Chinese students living in the U.S. to their stay and  perm ission to apply for immi­
grant visas during that period. President Bush vetoed the bill accusing it o f depriving 
him  of necessary flexibility in conducting foreign policy14 (Hurst 1999： 41). The MFN 
status was a crucial m atter for China because trade had  becom e an econom ic lifeli­
ne. By 1990, China was the U.S.’s tenth largest trading partner； Chinese imports w ere 
estim ated at $12 billion in 1989. In May 1991, the Bush adm inistration renew ed MFN 
status for China, justifying their decision by  saying that w ithdraw al of MFN status 
w ould  hurt the very groups the U.S. sought to pro tect15 (Hurst 1999： 208). W estern- 
oriented sectors of the econom y w ould  suffer the most. The Bush adm inistration still 
believed that the continuance of trade under norm al conditions w ould  prom ote 
hum an rights in China and m ake the Chinese leaders yielding. Simultaneously, it 
w ould  cham pion the econom ic interests of the United States. President Bush discus­
sed  at length China’s liberalization progress, rather than its hum an rights record, 
stressing that China had  lifted martial law  in Bejing and  Lhasa and  released 573 p eo ­
ple from  prisons. H um an Rights W atch poin ted  ou t that the hum an rights im prove­
m ents in early 1990 only reflected an  effort to influence U.S. policy. H um an rights 
groups voiced skepticism  that the lifting of martial law  w as anything m ore than co­
smetic change. Moreover, they said that the President had  exaggerated16 the num ber 
o f 570 political prisoners released and  by no t announcing their nam es and  no t allo­
w ing international inspectors to visit jails and prisons, granted “a kind of am nesty”17 
(H um an Rights W atch Report 1990).
Despite the econom ic sanctions im posed, the Chinese governm ent carried out 
num erous hum an rights abuses in 1990. In the spring, it launched a massive national 
“anti-crim e” cam paign. B etw een May and  Septem ber public security authorities arre­
sted at least 986,000 people, a large num ber of them  w ere executed  -  estim ates vary
11 In C ongress’s opinion, China w as expected  to realize that if it d id  no t reform  itself fur­
th er sanctions w ou ld  be  im posed.
12 This legislation w ou ld  required  Bush to certify that China had  “fully realized” its 
“m istakes” in term s of hum an right protection and  m ade “significant progress” to renew  MFN 
status in 1991.
13 Making econom ical contracts conditional on  im provem ent o f hum an rights w as not 
a n ew  idea in the U.S. foreign policy. In 1988 the U.S. Senate a ttem pted to  link up the tech- 
nolo14gies transfer w ith the im provem ent o f hum an rights in Tibet.
14 The H ouse overtu rned  B ush’s veto b y  390 votes to 25.
15 President Bush claim ed that the reason for renew ing MFN status w as “not econom ic. It’s 
no t strategic. It’s moral. It is right to  expand  the ideals o f freedom  and  dem ocracy to  China...
It is w rong  to isolate China if w e hope to influence China.”
16 H um an Rights W atch no ted  that the first 573 releases w ere announced  in January, days
before a key vote in C ongress on  legislation to  protect the m ore than 40,000 Chinese students 
in the U.S. against involuntary return  to  China. A nother release o f 211 w as announced  in May, 
on  the eve o f P resident’s Bush decision no t to  w ithhold  MFN trading status from  China.
17 Vice President Q uayle w en t so far as to proclaim  that the lifting of martial law  w as 
a ‘d iv idend’ o f the President’s policy tow ards China.
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from  500 to several thousand. D uring 1990, the w retched prison conditions and 
frequently brutal treatm ent o f the T iananm en detainees show ed no  signals o f im­
provem ent. Furtherm ore, the right of free expression w as severely limited by  the 
governm ent in its effort to w hip journalists back into their role as a loyal “tongue 
and  throat” of the Party. The governm ent laid dow n nationw ide control and  restric­
tions on  the right o f assem bly and  public dem onstration and  reasserted tight control 
over publishing and  the new s media, reducing the ranks o f journalists, publishers 
and  distributors (H um an Rights W atch Report 1990). The foreign journalists and 
Chinese academ ics and intellectuals w ho avoided being im prisoned during the 4 
June crackdow n experienced serious harassm ent and  intimidation, greater than any 
they had  experienced since the Cultural Revolution.18 G overnm ent repression of 
ethnic and  religious groups also show ed no  sign o f easing in 1990.
In August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait w hich w as m et w ith an  im m ediate ultim atum  
from  the United States and  other m em bers of the UN. President Bush realized the 
necessity o f cooperation w ith China on  that issue. China could veto the UN resolu­
tion im posing sanctions against Iraq. Moreover, China had  extensive political and 
military ties in the region, therefore it w ould  likely oppose  U.S. military presence 
there. Bush perceived the Gulf crisis as a opportunity  for China to rehabilitate on  the 
international arena. Thus, he strongly encouraged China’s governm ent to cooperate. 
O n the o ther hand, China h o p ed  that the necessity o f solidarity am ong the UN Secu­
rity Council m em bers19 w ould  let it dem onstrate its com m itm ent to peace, and  thus 
the W estern pow ers w ould  b lank ou t the Tiananm en m assacre (G arson 1994： 202). 
This pragm atic approach  to UN action in the Persian Gulf was based  on  the 
expectation that China w ould  be rew arded for its support w ith the creation o f an 
external environm ent that w ould  favor its dom estic reforms.
In May 1992, Bush notified Congress that he had  the intention o f renew ing Chi­
n a ’s MFN status. Congress did no t affirm that China deserved preferential trade con­
ditions no t only because of continued hum an rights abuses bu t also, because of 
China’s supply  of advanced military technologies to unstable regions20 (G arson 1994： 
209). Congress w ould  grant China MFN status in 1992, if it fulfilled a num ber of 
rigorous requirem ents. China was pressured to release political prisoners w ho had 
taken part in the T iananm en dem onstrations, to stop exporting goods p roduced  by 
forced prison labor, to halt transfers of M-9 and  M-11 missiles to Iran and  Syria, and 
to com ply w ith multilateral non-proliferation agreem ents, including the Missile 
Technology Control Regime21 and  the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Hurst 1999： 208­
209).
18 For exam ple, several foreign journalists w ere beaten  and  detained  around  the first ann i­
versary of the June 4 m assacre. Access to the PRC w as tightly restricted for journalists from  
H ong Kong and  M acau u n d er regulations banning  te lephone interviews and  requiring them  to 
apply  for perm ission to en ter China 15 days in advance.
19 China vo ted  for the first eleven UN resolutions condem ning Iraqis attack on  Kuwait, al­
though  it abstained on  the twelfth 一 Resolution 678 (1990) o f 29 N ovem ber 1990 一 w hich 
authorized the UN to take all necessary m easures to force Iraq to w ithdraw.
20 China w as the fourth largest arm s trader, taking 10% of the w orld  m arket share. Arms 
w ere sold to  the K hm er Rouge, Syria and  Iran. China w as also help ing Algeria build  a nuclear 
reactor.
21 The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) w as in troduced  in 1987 by  Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U nited K ingdom  and  the U nited States. The aim  o f the 
MTCR is to  limit the proliferation o f missiles capable o f delivering w eapons of m ass destruc­
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Bush tried to defeat the m easure bu t did not stop the resolution from  being pas­
sed  by the H ouse o f Representative by 409 votes to 21 (G arson 1994： 210). Thus, he 
vetoed  it and justified it by  saying that the result o f lost MFN status by  China w ould  
w eaken  ties to the W est and  further repression. The Senate could no t override the 
presidential veto and  China m aintained MFN status for the another year.
By the end  1992, China tried to revive a positive image o f itself intent on  playing 
a m ore im portant international role. It secured m em bership in GATT by limiting 
restrictive trade practices and  established diplom atic relations w ith South Korea. 
Even though China criticized U.S. support of dem ocratic reform  in H ong Kong and 
the selling of F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan, it kep t its econom y o p en  to foreign 
investm ents, especially from  H ong Kong and  Taiwan. The Hong Kong m atter was 
crucial to China because it facilitated the reform  process, opened  up  the econom y in 
southern  China, and  conveyed Chinese intentions in the New W orld Order. The 
econom ic sanctions created an  enorm ous opportunity  for H ong Kong to bridge the 
chasm  betw een  China and  W estern pow ers. H ong Kong also w as the interm ediary 
betw een  the m ainland and  Taiwan because then  the two countries did no t m aintain 
political and  econom ical relations22 (Askari, Forrer, Teegen, Yang 2003： 42). If Hong 
K ong’s econom y was ham pered  by the transition from  British to Chinese rule than 
China’s plans for reforms and  prosperity under a centralized, authoritarian governan­
ce w ould  seem  futile. H ong Kong w ould  be  either the source of China’s strength or 
its collapse. The U.S. also protected  their interests in Hong Kong. By 1990 Hong 
Kong was the U.S.’s fourth largest export m arket in Asia. The Hong Kong econom y 
w as o p en  to foreign trade transactions, and  the H ong Kong dollar was tied to the 
U.S. dollar, therefore the $6 billion o f U.S. investm ent w as no t surprising (G arson 
1994： 212). The Americans realized that a failure to grant MFN status to China w ould  
have had  a disastrous effect o n  H ong Kong. Bush also claim ed that lifting sanctions 
w ould  facilitate econom ic integration in East Asia and keep the region m ore likely to 
w elcom e a continuing American military presence in the area. But w hen  the presi­
dential election w as com ing Bush realized that, in trade terms, China w as the main 
beneficiary o f MFN, and  thus he insisted on  a tougher approach  to it during his p re­
sidential cam paign in 1992 than his Democratic challenger Bill Clinton did. Bush 
dem anded  China to cease the restrictive regulations and  quantitative barriers to U.S. 
imports. Clinton prom ised to review  Bush’s resistance to the im position o f condi­
tions for MFN status and  proclaim ed to m ake it conditional o n  hum an rights im­
provem ents.
After his electoral victory in Novem ber 1992, Clinton decided that China’s offen­
ding policy should  be  dealt w ith the MFN fram ew ork (G arson 1994： 214). He still 
believed that increased trade and  liberalization o f China’s regulations w ould  assimi­
late the PRC into the w orld community. However, the issue of China’s huge trade 
surplus w ith the U.S. and  its record on  hum an rights and  arms sales w ould  still be 
a hurdle to overcom e before full trade norm alization could be achieved. President 
Clinton postponed  the day of judgm ent on  MNF and  it d id  no t pu t forth any solu­
tions in terms o f hum an right abuses or arms sales. The Clinton adm inistration was
tion. A lthough China w as no t a m em ber of the MTCR and  m oreover, it w as subject to  periodic 
sanctions, it agreed  in 1992 to abide b y  the original MTCR guidelines.
22 H ow ever, such a position of H ong Kong has its challenges. The interm ediary position 
d epends on  relations betw een  China and  the U.S. If the U.S. im posed  a total trade em bargo 
against China, H ong Kong w ould  have no  role to  play. O n the o ther hand, in the case o f ful 
integration w ith China and  the global econom y, H ong K ong’s role w ou ld  be  underm ined.
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under pressure from  big business and  the Treasury and  Commerce D epartm ents not 
to squander the chance o f American business in the w orld’s largest m arket and  ina­
dvertently providing trade opportunities to America’s com petitors. The U.S. govern­
m ent could not p retend  that the threat o f trade sanctions w ould  cause the Chinese 
governm ent to change track (G arson 1994： 217).
That is why, on  26th May 1993, Clinton renew ed  MFN status for China w hich m et 
w ith strong protests from  hum an rights groups and  supporters of trade sanctions. 
They accused Clinton of turning his back on  millions of oppressed  Chinese and  of 
ignoring recent reports o f a string of political im prisonm ents th roughout the country. 
Clinton justified his decision as a necessity to gain Chinese support in the confronta­
tion w ith North Korea over its refusal to adm it international inspectors to its nuclear 
installations.
CONCLUSION
Both the Bush and  Clinton adm inistration failed in im proving hum an rights in China 
despite their repeated  prom ises that their policies w ould. Furtherm ore, the situation 
deteriorated seriously, bu t statem ents by each adm inistration did not reflect this 
trend. Although China objected to alm ost all the rationales that had  m otivated U.S. 
sanctions against it, China cooperated  w ith the United States in the resolution of 
issues and in preventing a trade war. Since the beginning of China’s econom ic re­
forms, China has established m any trade-related laws and  regulations, provide trade 
transparency, liberalized its dom estic m arket, and  generally establish harm onization 
w ith international com m ercial practices. But the expectations of post-Reagan adm ini­
strations have not b een  met. The econom ic grow th did no t see progress in the pro­
tection of hum an rights in China. Considering that the effectiveness of sanctions 
should  be  m easured no t by the volum e of business activity generated, bu t rather by 
the degree of change in desired behavior of the target regime, the U.S. sanctions 
im posed on  China w ere unsuccessful. The role o f the U.S. econom ic sanctions was 
limited to express condem nation for hum an rights violations committing by  Chinese 
regime. In case of hum anitarian conditions in China, the following administrations 
have pursued  a long-term  strategy based  o n  conviction that cooperation w ith China’s 
governm ent in transform ation of econom ic system tow ards free-m arket econom y 
w ould  result in im provem ent o f hum an rights protection. The short-term  strategy 
w ere im plem ented on  the g round o f USA-China econom ic relations oriented towards 
m utual profits.
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